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 1 
ALLOCATION OF BLAME FOR MEDICAL ERRORS AMONG PHYSICIANS, NURSES 
AND ADMINISTRATORS. 
Stephen E. Gordon and Grace Jenq. Department of Internal Medicine, Yale University, 
School of Medicine, New Haven, CT. 
Despite significant efforts among health care leaders in the past two decades to move away 
from the so-called “culture of blame”, individual blame for medical errors is still a significant 
presence in health care settings. Furthermore, little is understood about how individual people 
assign blame, and what differences, if any, exist between different health care professionals 
in how they assign individual blame. 
The study tested three hypotheses regarding the allocation of blame for medical errors. 
Hypothesis #1: Despite a shift towards systems-based thinking, health care professionals will 
blame individuals rather than the system for medical errors. Hypothesis #2: Even when given 
the exact same information, health care professionals will allocate blame or accountability for 
medical errors differently depending on their role in the health care system. Hypothesis #3: In 
general, health care professionals will allocate blame disproportionately towards other 
professions rather than blame their own professions. 
We conducted a detailed survey centered on a set of three standardized cases, each involving 
fictitious clinical vignettes during a single patient admission. Each case involved multiple 
medical errors, each of which was necessary but insufficient in isolation to result in the 
adverse outcome. After each case respondents allocated blame for the medical errors among 
four root causes that corresponded to nurses, physicians, and hospital administrators. A self-
blame ratio was calculated which examined the extent to which people disproportionately 
assigned blame to their own profession compared to the level of blame assigned them by 
other respondents. 
 2 
Overall, when given specific cases, respondents placed more blame on individuals than on 
systemic factors. Respondents placed more blame on physicians than on nurses, and hospital 
administrators placed more blame on the system and culture (non-individual factors) than 
either physicians or nurses placed on these factors. Respondents’ role within the health care 
system was of significant predictive value in determining how they would assign blame for 
standardized cases. ANOVA of the mean values of blame allocation across all three cases 
demonstrated statistically significant differences by respondent’s position for blame 
allocation to nurses (p =.004) and blame allocation to hospital system (p =.017) but not for 
blame allocation to physicians or blame allocated to hospital culture (p =.256 and p =.333, 
respectively). Self-blame scores averaged above 1.00 (1.20±.50, N=85), indicating that 
respondents in general placed more blame on their own professions than others placed on 
them. This held true across all three groups, but was the most pronounced with nurses 
(1.40±.48, N=24), moderately pronounced with administrators (1.09±.34, N=38), and the 
least pronounced with physicians (1.17±.67, N=23). ANOVA of differences between groups 
was statistically significant (p =.049).  
Conclusions: Respondents placed more blame on individuals than non-individuals; role 
within the hospital was a significant predictor of blame allocation; and respondents overall 
tended to blame their own professions more than others blamed them. 
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In 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) changed the landscape of health care with its publication 
of the landmark study To Err is Human, which estimated that every year somewhere between 
58,000 and 98,000 people died in the United States due to medical errors [1]. Since then the focus 
on quality improvement in US hospitals has dramatically increased.  
One of the core tenets of current quality improvement movement is the need to move past the so-
called “culture of blame” that has historically prevailed in health care. Many experts argue that 
shifting the energy that has historically been spent on determining who is at fault could be 
channeled into improvement efforts. 
This thesis examines to what extent health care professionals still blame medical errors on 
individuals, rather than on the health care system, and in particular asks how health care 
professionals attribute individual blame for medical errors differently based on their role in the 
health care system. Our research focuses specifically on the differences in blame attribution 
between nurses, physicians and hospital administrators. 
The reason for this work is our belief, through experience, that despite the emphasis on systems, 
individual blame is still very much present in health care environments. This phenomenon is not, 
however, well understood. When medical errors or near misses occur, people still often finger-
point and assign blame. It is unclear, however, how much of this is because of people’s different 
knowledge about the specific event in question, and how much is because of   a more 




To answer this question we conducted an extensive survey of 105 health care professionals at the 
Yale-New Haven Hospital. In this survey we presented respondents with three fictitious but 
realistic clinical vignettes, each of which involved multiple medical errors, and contributions 
from each of the three central groups of health care professionals—nurses, physicians, and 
administrators. After each case they were asked to assign blame for the final outcome among 
different factors. To supplement our quantitative findings, we also conducted a series of seven 
focus groups consisting of survey respondents. Given the breadth of this topic and the richness of 
our data, this thesis represents a presentation of our pilot data with our initial analysis, with 
further mathematical and qualitative analysis planned for the future. 
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A literature review was conducted to provide background information on topics relevant to this 
study and to establish whether there existed prior studies examining this topic. An academic 
medical librarian was consulted for advice on databases, literature review techniques, and search 
terms. Our review examined the concepts of blame and medical errors independently and then 
focused on the intersection of these two areas. Finally, we explored our planned methodology to 
determine if our techniques had previously been employed. 
Definitions 
The IOM defines a medical error as “the failure to complete a planned action as intended or the 
use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim.” An adverse event is defined as “an injury caused by 
medical management rather than by the underlying disease or condition of the patient” [1]. Not all 
adverse events involve the failure to complete planned actions or the use of a wrong plan, and 
therefore many adverse events do not represent medical errors. Conversely, not every medical 




do. Medical errors and adverse events are therefore separate but overlapping concepts. The focus 
of our work is on medical errors that do result in adverse events. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “blame” as follows [2]: 
1. The action of censuring; expression of disapprobation; imputation of demerit on 
account of a fault or blemish; reproof; censure; reprehension. 
2. A charge, an accusation. Obs. 
3. Blameworthiness, culpability; fault. arch. 
4. Responsibility for anything wrong, culpability; esp. in to lay the blame on, to bear the 
blame. 
5. Injury, hurt. Obs. 
For the sake of our survey, we intentionally did not define blame, but rather left this open to 
individual interpretation. We did, however, state that we considered the terms “blame,” 
“accountability,” “responsibility,” and “fault” to be synonymous within the context of our survey. 
Individual Blame in Health Care 
It is widely agreed that, at least through the 1980s, there has been a great deal of emphasis on 
assigning blame to individuals for medical errors. Historically, analysis of medical errors has 
been built on three tenets: (1) every medical error has a specific cause; (2) an individual or group 
of individuals can be identified who could have prevented the error; and (3) individuals represent 
the unreliable components of the system [3]. As a result, post-error analysis has focused on 
identifying the cause, which is usually a person, and holding them accountable, and the analysis 
has then stopped once such an individual or group is identified.  
The literature offers several potential explanations for this historical emphasis on assigning 




not hurt, by their caregivers, so when they are hurt by their care they feel that they were wronged 
and that someone must be to blame [4]. As Edward Campion states in a 2003 article in the New 
England Journal of Medicine on the tragic death of a young girl at Duke resulting from an organ 
transplant mismatch [5]: “In the aftermath of such a disaster there must be an assignment of 
blame.” The evidence of this need to assign blame when someone is hurt is supported by what is 
known as the “outcome bias” in health care: empirically, individual blame is attributed 
proportionally to the outcome, rather than the degree of error. Studies have shown that the 
likelihood of finding care to be substandard is more common when the degree of harm caused is 
severe, despite the fact that many experts argue that outcome is a poor proxy for blameworthiness 
[4].  
Another reason for the close connection between blame and health care is that compensation 
system for medical injuries, at least in the US, is currently inextricably linked to assigning blame: 
absent the development of a no-fault administrative system for compensation, an injured person’s 
award depends on finding fault (or a high enough probability of fault as to result in settlement) 
[6].  
Finally, in the end, blaming individuals is easier for most people to understand. As David Hsia 
writes in a 2003 editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association [7]: “The name-
blame-shame model produces readily understandable headlines.” It is much harder to think about 
systems, for the public as well as those within health care. As Donald Berwick is quoted saying: 
“Systems thinking is not easy, and may even seem unnatural. Part of the reason is the need to deal 





History of the Culture of Blame in Health Care 
Across the late 1980s and 1990s a new way of thinking about medical errors began to emerge. 
Fueled by academic research on error theory, the so-called “new look” at medical errors focused 
on studying both human and system factors in the creation of medical errors. The result of this 
research was a significantly more complicated and less individual-based view of the etiology of 
medical errors. A few of the key findings of this research are worthy of discussion. 
First, this research showed that accidents in systems as complicated as health care delivery occur 
due to multiple small failures rather than single large failures, each of which is “necessary but 
only jointly sufficient to produce the accident” [3]. Medical errors are seldom caused by an 
individual making a mistake; rather, they result from complex interactions between different 
people, systems, and technology [8]. These system weaknesses—often called “latent factors”—
typically exist well before the error that brings them to light occurs. These factors constantly 
exist, but because the system involves multiple layers of checks, only rarely do these weaknesses 
all align to actually result in a medical error. This concept of alignment is often described like the 
holes in Swiss cheese: while there are bubbles throughout a block of the cheese, only rarely do 
the holes align such that you can see right through a whole piece. 
The second finding of this research, which logically follows, is on the increased need to 
understand systems in order to reduce errors. This belief in the importance of systems is 
summarized by Berwick, who states that: “Every system is perfectly designed to achieve exactly 
the results it gets [8]. In his landmark book on human error, J.T. Reason explained how 
individuals inherit rather than cause accidents: “Rather than being the main instigators of an 
accident, operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects….[T]heir part is that of adding the 




The third key finding of this research is the extent to which errors can be prevented through the 
creation of high-reliability systems and individuals. The emphasis therefore shifts from creating 
systems that prevent medical errors rather than figuring out who is to blame after the fact. Edward 
Deming, the founder of the continuous quality improvement (CQI) model, argues that human 
error is ultimately inevitable, and that systems need to be created that detect and eliminate this 
error [7]. As Lucian Leap explains [3]: “The new look at human error has shown that robust, high 
reliability individuals, teams, systems, and organizations are able to recognize trouble before 
negative consequences occur.” 
As a result of this research, the past two decades have witnessed a growing movement away from 
blaming individuals. An early and widely influential piece by Donald Berwick appeared in the 
New England Journal of Medicine in 1989, calling physicians to act on this new way of thinking. 
Berwick, who has since become one of the most influential leaders in quality improvement, asked 
the reader to begin by imagining a factory [10]:  
IMAGINE two assembly lines, monitored by two foremen. Foreman 1 walks the line, 
watching carefully. “I can see you all,” he warns. “I have the means to measure your 
work, and I will do so. I will find those among you who are unprepared or unwilling to do 
your jobs, and when I do there will be consequences. There are many workers available 
for these jobs, and you can be replaced.” Foreman 2 walks a different line, and he too 
watches. “I am here to help you if I can,” he says. “We are in this together for the long 
haul. You and I have a common interest in a job well done. I know that most of you are 
trying very hard, but sometimes things can go wrong. My job is to notice opportunities 
for improvement—skills that could be shared, lessons from the past, or experiments to try 
together—and to give you the means to do your work even better than you do now. I 
want to help the average ones among you, not just the exceptional few at either end of the 
spectrum of competence.” 
It is clear, Berwick argues, that foreman 2’s approach is going to produce superior results. 




In the years since, this movement away from focusing on individuals and towards focusing on 
systems has received considerable support, most notably from the aforementioned study To Err is 
Human published by the IOM in 2001. The key argument of this study, as suggested by its title, 
was that human error is inevitable in medicine, and that a safer health care system depends on the 
creation of systems that ensure patient safety.   
So where are we now? How far have we come in moving past the culture of blame? Despite the 
enormous focus on medical errors since the IOM study, it is unclear exactly how far we have 
come in changing our thinking [11]. While a great deal of time and money has been spent on 
studying issues of quality improvement, little is known about how much people’s thinking about 
medical errors has truly changed. 
Differences in How People Assign Blame 
Furthermore, little, if anything, is known about the differences in how people assign blame for 
medical errors. When someone is blamed for an error, they are likely to be defensive, and to 
potentially disagree with the level of blame they are assigned. But it is difficult to know whether 
this disagreement stems solely from their desire to defend themselves or from other factors. In 
addition, even if the ramifications of blame were not an issue, disagreement among how people 
involved in a medical error assign blame cannot factor out differences in the information known 
by each of the participants. Blame allocation after real adverse events necessarily involves at least 
some degree of information asymmetry; by virtue of the participants’ different roles in the event, 
they each are privy to different sets of information about exactly what happened. So it is 
impossible to know whether they inherently would assign blame differently or if they are doing 




THE CURRENT STUDY 
This brings us to our current study and the questions we want to examine. The current study sets 
out to examine three specific questions regarding the allocation of blame for medical errors: (1) 
Despite changes in thinking about medical errors, to what extent do health care professionals still 
assign individual blame for medical errors? (2) What role does a person’s position within the 
health care system play in determining how they allocate blame? (3) Do people tend to blame 
other people more than themselves? Our three hypotheses for these questions, which draw from 
our own personal experiences as well as our review of literature, are as follows: 
Hypothesis #1: Despite a shift towards systems-based thinking, health care professionals 
will blame individuals rather than the system for medical errors.  
Hypothesis #2: Even when given the exact same information, health care professionals 
will allocate blame or accountability for medical errors differently depending on their 
role in the health care system.  
Hypothesis #3: In general, health care professionals will allocate blame 
disproportionately towards other professions rather than blame their own professions. 
To test these hypotheses we conducted a detailed survey centered on a set of three standardized 
cases. Our belief was that by using standardized cases would allow us to work around the issue of 
information asymmetry, and uncover any inherent differences in how different people assign 
blame. At the end of each case respondents were asked to allocate blame for the medical errors 
among four root causes that corresponded to nurses, physicians, and hospital administrators. We 
then examined how nurses, physicians, and administrators allocated blame differently among 
themselves.  
Finally, we conducted a series of seven focus groups with survey respondents to better understand 




are limited to determining how realistic respondents considered our clinical cases to be, and how 
well they understood the questions they were being asked. A full analysis of the content of these 







CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter we provide an overview of the methodology used in our survey-based research and 
analysis. As previously mentioned, the qualitative part of our research, which consisted of a series 
of seven focus groups, was limited to informing our sense of the validity of our survey and how 
well respondents understood what they were being asked.  
1.1 THE SURVEY 
The survey itself is presented in APPENDIX A. Discussion of the design, structure, administration 
and analysis of the survey is provided in this chapter. 
Survey Design 
Our survey was designed to elicit candid responses from health care professionals on how they 
attribute blame for medical errors. The survey was designed in consultation with academic faculty 
in health services research. Generally accepted principles of survey design were followed. The 
clinical cases (described below) were developed based on individual recollections of commonly 
occurring medical errors. The cases were each reviewed by staff physicians, nurses and hospital 
administrators to ensure realism and increase subtlety so as to maximize the sensitivity of our 
instrument. 
Survey Structure 
Our survey consisted of four sections. The first section consisted solely of demographic variables. 
Due to concerns over anonymity, these were limited to position, the units on which the 
respondent typically worked, tenure in current position, and tenure at the hospital. The second 




medical errors and their prevention. The third section, which constituted the core of our survey, 
consisted of our clinical vignettes, which are described in more detail below. The fourth and final 
section consisted of a brief set of validation questions designed to help evaluate the accuracy of 
the answers (discussed in more detail on page 21). 
The Cases 
The clinical cases consisted of three fictitious clinical vignettes, each involving multiple medical 
errors. We decided to use three cases, and focus on the average results across them, because we 
believed this would create a more sensitive instrument for testing our hypotheses: any one case, 
due to its specifics, could focus too heavily on factors that might unnecessarily skew out findings. 
Each case involved a single patient admission and included multiple errors, each of which was 
alone necessary but insufficient to result in the adverse outcome, as in the “Swiss Cheese” model 
of medical errors discussed in the introduction. All three of the scenarios result in either the 
patient’s death or permanent vegetative state. A summary of some of the key factors involved in 









These cases were designed with four principles in mind. First, we wanted them to be as realistic 
as possible so that our data would be representative of people’s thinking about real-life medical 
errors. This goal stretches across both the clinical events described as well as the ways in which 
the system functioned. Second, in addition to being realistic, we wanted our three cases, 
collectively, to be representative of the types of errors that commonly occur. How people attribute 
blame to instances that rarely happen is not helpful; we want to know how people think about 
everyday events. Third, we wanted our cases to be sufficiently nuanced and subtle as to allow any 
inherent differences in how people assign blame to be brought out in the data. Accordingly, the 
events described in our cases avoid clear-cut instances of negligence or misconduct and focus 
instead on events in which people contributed to medical errors primarily through accidental 
oversight, lack of proper information, or inadequate resources.  
Structure of Blame Attribution 
We allowed respondents to assign blame across four factors: nurses, physicians, hospital systems, 
and hospital culture. In an effort to allow for a more elegant and mathematically rigorous 
breakdown of blame attribution, our four-end targets were first divided into individuals and non-
individuals. The individuals were then divided between physicians and nurses, and the non-
individual factors were divided between hospital system and hospital culture. At each divide the 






Despite their symmetry in our breakdown, these divisions are not all of equal interest. The divides 
between individuals and non-individuals and between physicians and nurses are of primary 
interest. The divide between hospital system and hospital culture, while interesting, is of 
secondary importance. As a result, in many of our analyses we group hospital system and culture 
together and simply refer to them as the non-individual factors. Since this constitutes replacing 
two end-targets with their parent, the sum of these three end-points—physicians, nurses, and non-
individual factors—still equals 100%. This overall structure is illustrated in CHART 1.2.1 
                                                     
1 The actual numbers in some of the tables do not total to exactly 100% due to the fact that we are taking means at the 





As discussed, our analysis divided health care professionals into three categories—nurses, 
physicians, and hospital administrators—and we were interested in how these three groups 
assigned blame among themselves. Through early discussions with hospital leaders and health 
care academics, however, it became clear that it was exceedingly difficult—and largely 
philosophical—to allocate blame for specific clinical cases to hospital administrators, since their 
impact on individual clinical outcomes consists primarily of their ability to influence hospital 
systems and culture. Accordingly, we decided to include “hospital system” and “hospital culture” 
in our blame attribution, and use this as a proxy for hospital administrators. This assumption is 
somewhat validated by the data collected in the responsibility questions, as discussed on page 
21 of this manuscript. As a result of this we had four end-targets for our blame analysis: nurses, 






The survey was opened for completion in February 2009, and was administered both in paper 
versions and in an online format. The online version was created using the SurveyMonkey.com 
application, and paper copies were collected and entered with the help of a research assistant.  
Due to the length of the survey, which we estimated would take 20-30 minutes to complete, we 
set a target N of 30 responses for the nurse, physician and administrator groups. With the 
exception of administrators, survey participants were limited to the six medical units of Yale-New 
Haven Hospital, and did not include any intensive care units or step-down units. Invited 
participants were limited to nurses, nurse managers, physician assistants and APRNs, attending 
physicians, 2nd and 3rd year residents in internal medicine, and mid- and senior-level hospital 
administrators. Extensive recruitment efforts were made including fliers, repeated 
announcements, and a raffle for gift certificates for massages. Despite our efforts, we faced 
considerable problems in recruiting respondents, and needed to repeatedly extend our timeline for 
completion. Difficulty in recruitment varied significantly by position, with the most severe 
difficulty among staff nurses, and the least difficulty among full-time Yale faculty members who 
serve as attending physicians. These difficulties in our recruitment efforts are reflected in our 
estimated response rates, which were significantly different by position. We estimate our 
physician response rate to be 29% based on 40 responses from approximately 136 physicians 
targeted in our outreach (36 residents, 50 faculty members, and 50 hospitalists). Our nursing 
response rate, however, is estimated to be much lower at approximately 12%, based on the fact 
that we had 28 responses from approximately 240 nurses targeted (40 nurses on each of the six 
units.) Our administrator response rate, however, was considerably higher, at an estimated 65%, 




The final data for this manuscript was downloaded at noon on March 18th, at which time 110 
people had started the survey, 105 had answered at least one content-related question (five 
respondents only provided demographic data), and 84 people had completed the survey (76.5%), 
meaning that they had reached the last page (although they may have skipped some questions). Of 
these 105 responses, nine were from mid-level providers (physician assistants or APRNs), whose 
responses we decided to exclude from our primary analysis.2 This resulted in 96 total responses. 
Because individual respondents were allowed to skip questions, the valid N for each question 
varies between a minimum of 81 and a maximum of 92 valid responses for every question.3 
1.2 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The survey data was first imported into Microsoft ® Excel for labeling and then into SPSS for 
statistical analysis. Missing values were ignored and were not included in calculations, with the 
exception of a respondent’s position, which, in the three cases in which they were left blank, 
could be inferred from the department in which the respondent worked. Several additional 
variables used in our analysis were then calculated from the raw survey data. These variables 
consisted primarily of averaging values across cases and normalizing the values assigned to the 
end-targets to sum to 100%. In addition, a metric for measuring self-blame was calculated. The 
full details of these calculations are provided in APPENDIX B. 
Once our variables were calculated we began our statistical analysis. The core steps in this 
analysis consisted of (1) calculating descriptions of the data; (2) calculating means values across 
all respondents; (3) analysis of variance (ANOVA) of mean answers across different groups of 
                                                     
2 The mid-level providers were all targeted through our efforts to recruit members of the hospitalist service. Since at 
our target hospital these providers function in much the same was as medical residents, we had initially planned to 
include these responses in our physician category (which we had named physician/clinician). However, we later 
decided that given their significantly different training and background, it would skew our results to include them in 
our analysis. As a result, all of the data in this manuscript does not include these nine responses. 




respondents (nurses, physicians, and administrators); and (4) calculation of the actual mean 
values among the three groups of respondents. 
1.3 DESCRIPTIONS OF THE DATA 






TABLE 1.2: NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS IN ANALYSIS* 
BY POSITION 
      
 Position N Percent   
 Nurses 28 29%   
 Physicians(1) 42 44%   
 Administrators(2) 26 27%   
 Total 96 100%   
      
*Excludes mid-level providers 
(1) Includes 20 residents and 22 attending physicians 





CHAPTER 2: RESULTS 
The core findings of our survey are summarized in this chapter. In the first part of this chapter we 
discuss the results of our data for all respondents. In the second part of this chapter we look at 
how nurses, physicians, and administrators responded differently to these questions. 
2.1 RESULTS ACROSS ALL RESPONDENTS 
General Beliefs about Causes of Medical Errors 
The first substantive questions on the survey, questions 6 through 9, concerned respondents’ 
beliefs about how often they believe different individuals and aspects of the hospital system and 
culture contribute to medical errors. Unlike the case-based questions, these questions were 
answered on a 5-point scale (1=never, 3=sometimes, 5=almost always). The first of these 
questions focused on individuals, the hospital system, and the hospital culture, and the results are 

























Interestingly, when asked at this level, respondents believed that the hospital system contributed 
most frequently to medical errors.  
To break out the overall perceived contribution of individuals, we then asked how often 
respondents believed different groups of hospital staff contributed to medical errors. The overall 
results of this question are presented in CHART 2.2. 
 
As we can see, respondents overall placed significantly more culpability on individuals directly 
involved in patient care (nurses, physician assistants, residents, and attending physicians) and 
much less blame on administrators (nurse managers, as well as mid-level and senior hospital 
administrators). As one might expect, respondents also placed considerably less blame on lower-










































Responsibility for Hospital System and Culture 
The responsibility questions, which correspond to questions 10 and 11 on the survey, asked the 
degree to which respondents believed five different groups of individuals within the hospital 
(nurses, nurse managers, physicians, senior administrators, and the hospital’s board of trustees) 
were responsible for determining hospital system and hospital culture. Answers were similarly 
given on a 5-point scale, and are presented in CHART 2.3. 
 




























While not overwhelming in comparison, looking at the answers to both of these questions 
together makes it clear that, overall, respondents placed the greatest responsibility for hospital 
systems and hospital culture on senior hospital administrators. We believe this supports our use 
of hospital systems and culture (the so-called “non-individual factors”) as a proxy for the blame 
attributed to hospital administrators in our case-based results. 
Case-Based Results 
Our case-based questions constitute the core of our analysis. As explained in the introduction, the 
goal of these questions was to allow us to determine how different parties assign blame even 
when given the exact same information. Blame allocation after real adverse events typically 
involves some degree of information asymmetry; by virtue of the participants’ different roles in 
the event, they each are privy to different sets of information about exactly what happened. Our 
feeling was that using standardized cases would at least theoretically allow us to work around this 



























The overall blame allocation, across all three cases, for all respondents, is provided in CHART 
2.5. 
 
As we can see, in contrast to the earlier question on perceived frequency of contribution to 
medical errors in general, when respondents were given specific cases, they allocated 
significantly more blame to individuals (63.1% for physicians and nurses combined) than to non-
individuals (37.5% combined).  
Given the low attribution to hospital culture, we can simplify most of our remaining results 
combining hospital systems and hospital culture into one category, which we will call non-
individual factors.  
While the overall picture established in CHART 2.5 holds true, there are some notable differences 
in how blame was allocated between the three cases. Mean values of responses, for all 






















Notably, the trend of blaming physicians above the other actors holds true across all three cases. 
However, the gap between nurses and physicians differs by case, with the widest gap in CASE #2 
(the case of a dropped medication on discharge), and the most equal allocation in CASE #3 (the 
case of a missed previously documented drug allergy). We also see that non-individual factors 
play a larger role in CASE #2 (dropped medication) than in CASE #1 (delayed diagnosis of a PE), 
and an even larger role in CASE #3 (missed drug allergy). The significance of these results is 
further explored in CHAPTER 3. 
Self-Blame Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 1, a “self-blame variable” was calculated to determine how much blame 
individuals assigned to their own profession compared with the amount of blame assigned to their 































to 1.00, with values above that representing a higher level of blame on one’s own position than 
the median. The overall results of this data are presented in CHART 2.7. 
 
Notably, as we can see, self-blame ratios varied only slightly across cases, and consistently 
averaged above 1.00. 
2.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NURSES, PHYSICIANS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
We now return to the beginning of our survey and examine how the answers we have just 
discussed varied by the type of respondent, specifically between nurses, physicians and 
administrators. The core of this part of our analysis relies on analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
which allows us to determine whether or not there were statistically significant differences 






















General Beliefs about Causes of Medical Errors 
Returning to our first questions on general beliefs about the causes of medical errors, our analysis 
demonstrated some noteworthy statistically significant differences. Specifically, ANOVA showed 
significant differences in how often nurses, physicians and administrators believe that 
individuals (p =.004) and hospital culture (p =.011) contribute to medical errors. There was not 
a statistically significant difference in beliefs about the contribution of system (p =.224). The 
corresponding mean values are provided in CHART 2.8. 
 
Notably, administrators felt systems contributed to medical errors more frequently than either 
nurses or physician believed they did. Nurses felt that individuals were the most common 
contributors to medical errors, while physicians felt that individuals and the system were tied for 






























Other contributors that yielded statistically significant differences included the contributions of 
nurses (p =.004), workload (p =.011), documentation (p =.021), mid-level hospital administrators 
(p =.029), inter-departmental processes (p =.039),  and nurse managers (p =.041). The mean 
levels of these results, by respondent’s position, are presented in CHART 2.9. 
 
Responsibility for Hospital System and Culture 
For the hospital system, ANOVA demonstrated statistically significant differences by group for 
responsibility of nurses (p =.003) and responsibility of physicians (p =.019). The remaining 
positions (nurse managers, senior administrators, and the hospital’s board of trustees) were not 
significant for hospital system. The mean values for responses to this question on responsibility 


























































As we can see, a few trends begin to emerge from the data. Nurses held themselves, nurse 
managers, and physicians all more accountable did physicians and administrators. Physicians, on 
the other hand, held senior hospital administrators and the board of trustees more accountable 
than either nurses or administrators did.  
The same question, when asked about hospital culture instead of hospital system, did not yield 
statistically significant differences between our groups of respondents. 
Case-Based Results 
Now we will examine perhaps our most interesting analysis: how blame allocation varies by the 
respondent’s position. Quite notably, ANOVA of the mean values of blame allocation across all 
three cases demonstrated statistically significant differences by respondent’s position for blame 






































allocation to physicians, however, as well as blame allocated to hospital culture, were not 
statistically significant by themselves (p =.256 and p =.333, respectively). A summary of the 
responses across all three cases, broken out by the respondent’s position, is provided in CHART 
2.11. 
 
We will discuss the significance of these findings more in CHAPTER 3. Again, for the sake of 
simplicity, we will group hospital system and hospital culture together in our next few charts, so 





































Finally we turn back to our self-blame ratio, and examine the differences in the tendency to self-
blame between our three groups of respondents. Quite notably, our analysis demonstrated 
statistically significant differences between our three groups across case #1 (p =.025) and case #2 
(p =.041), but not among case #3 (p =.202). Differences between the overall self-blame variable 





























































Again, there is an overall trend towards self-blame, and this holds true across all three groups. 
The extent of this, however, differs significantly between groups, with nurses by far the most 
likely to disproportionately blame themselves, followed by administrators and then by physicians.  
At the case level these differences remained statistically significant. While the trends established 























With that we end our presentation of the results of our data. In CHAPTER 3 we will explore what 







































CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION 
In the first part of this chapter we discuss the significance of the findings presented in CHAPTER 2 
as they relate to our central research questions. In the second part of this chapter we discuss some 
of the strengths and weaknesses of our research. Finally, in the third part of this chapter, we draw 
some conclusions from our research as well as discuss some directions for future research. 
3.1 DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This section is organized around a series of key insights drawn from our analysis, and is 
organized around three parts: (1) overall blame allocation; (2) differences in blame allocation 
between nurses, physicians, and administrators; and (3) self-blame. 
Part I: Overall Blame Allocation 
1. Overall, when given specific cases, respondents placed more blame on 
individuals than on non-individual factors.  
This was a notable finding, considering the emphasis placed by health care experts on thinking 
about medical errors as the result of systems rather than individuals. The degree of this 
phenomenon varies significantly by case, however. For instance, non-individual factors play the 
largest role in CASE #3 (missed drug allergy), where the lack of communication between the 
hospital’s inpatient and outpatient medication systems was clearly evident. Non-individual factors 
similarly play a larger role in CASE #2 (the case of a dropped medication, where a forced 
discharge medication reconciliation could have prevented it) than in CASE #1 (the case of a 




flagging a diagnostic order as incomplete). The overall trend towards blaming individuals above 
systems nonetheless holds true across our cases. 
One possible reason for the greater emphasis on individual blame is that while our cases all 
involved clear systems failures, the descriptions of events focused more on what did happen than 
on what did not happen. The fact that respondents placed more weight on systemic factors when 
asked about their overall experiences in the past (in the general questions at the beginning of the 
survey, as discussed on page 19) suggests that this might be true. Furthermore, since system 
failures typically involve processes that fail to occur, this may considerably have 
underemphasized the potential for system issues to prevent the outcome. For instance, in CASE #2 
(dropped Coumadin) there was significantly more discussion of what each individual person did, 
and only one line about the hospital’s computer system not having a method for reconciling home 
versus discharge medications. That said, given the high degree of reality expressed about our 
cases in our focus groups, we feel that the underlying sentiment we see in our data reflects a true 
phenomena.  
The apparent contradiction with the general blame question is noteworthy, however, and the field 
of social psychology might help us understand it. The core tenet of attribution theory, the field 
of social psychology addressing this issue, is explained in a popular textbook on social 
psychology as follows [12]: 
We make inferences about a person’s behavior because we are interested in the cause of 
that behavior. When a person is late for a meeting, we want to know if the individual 
simply didn’t care or if something external, beyond his or her control, caused the late 
appearance. Although there is a widespread tendency to overlook external fact as causes 
of behavior, if you conclude that the person was late because of, say, illness at home, 
your inferences about that behavior will be more moderate than if you determined he or 




The founder of modern day attribution theory was Fritz Heider, who argued that there was a 
distinction between two kinds of attribution: internal attribution, the process of assigning 
causality to something about the person, and external attribution, the process of assigning 
causality to something about the situation. As Bordens explains [12]: 
Internal sources involve things about the individual character, personality, motives, 
dispositions, beliefs, and so on. External sources involve things about the situation-other 
people, various environmental stimuli, social pressure, coercion, and so on. 
Theories have since been built on the initial framework established by Heider. Among them is the 
“Correspondence Bias,” also sometimes known as the “Fundamental Attribution Error,” which is 
of particular relevance to the current discussion. This theory suggests that people tend to view 
other people’s actions as being more based on internal attribution, whereas they view their own 
actions through the lens of external attribution. Put in other words, people tend to believe that 
they themselves act in response to their environments, while other people’s actions reflect who 
they are at their core.  
The fundamental attribution error may help explain what we are observing. In the general blame 
question, respondents were asked about contribution to medical errors from their own 
experiences. In these cases, people may have thought of themselves, and accordingly viewed their 
past actions through the lens of internal attribution, believing that when they were involved in 
medical errors they were acting due to their surroundings, and not due to their own inherent 
personalities. When reading the standardized cases, however, people may have been viewing the 
actions described through the lens of external attribution, and accordingly assigned more blame 
to the actors described. 
While this might explain the difference we observe between our general blame question and our 




data, the tendency is towards blaming individuals for medical errors, and it is worth exploring 
some of the reasons why this might be the case. Despite the significant evidence pointing towards 
the need to move away from individual blame, there remains a legitimate debate about the need 
for individual blame in health care. While the literature clearly reflects an overall sentiment away 
from individual blame, some experts point out the need to place limits on the extent to which this 
shift is taken. They argue that individual accountability serves as a necessary guard against 
people’s inherent tendency to become less conscientious over time. They further point out that 
assigning blame provides a psychological motivation to constantly improve one’s skills, and that 
it is only through the appropriate assignment of blame that the so-called “bad apples” among 
health care professionals—as rare as they may be—can be identified and weeded out from the 
system. 
Some also argue that the blame debate already has or soon will come full circle: once systems are 
established, the importance of personal accountability becomes paramount again. In a 2006 
editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Daniel Goldmann, a vice 
president at Donald Berwick’s Institute for Healthcare Improvement, explains this view as it 
relates to hand hygiene. After agreeing that hospital leaders are initially responsible for 
establishing a system that allows clinicians the time and knowledge needed to maintain good 
hygiene, he argues that caregivers have an obligation to meticulously adhere to hand hygiene 
practices. Lamenting the fact that this often does not happen, he argues that the system can no 
longer be faulted [13]: “When this widely accepted, straightforward standard of care is violated, 
we cannot continue to blame the system.” 
Finally, some people argue that some degree of blame is not only necessary but actually 





[T]he problem with this blame free, systems perspective is that it shifts attention away 
from the inherently moral nature of medical practice, treating it—as its advocates 
intend—like any other industry. If only we had the right systems and the right financial 
incentives, the thinking goes, then our health system would produce healthy patient 
widgets 100% of the time.  
While it is difficult to know the true etiology of the phenomena we are observing, this is an 
interesting finding, and worthy of further investigation. 
2. Overall, respondents placed more blame on physicians than on nurses.  
This finding again varies by case, but the trend of blaming physicians the most holds true across 
all three cases. The gap between blame allocated to nurses and physicians differs, however, with 
widest gap in CASE #2 (dropped Coumadin) and the smallest gap in CASE #3 (missed drug 
allergy). The issue of how we constructed our cases may also play a significant role here, but, 
again, we believe the underlying sentiment to be reflecting true phenomena. We believe that the 
explanation for this is relatively simple. Physicians are widely believed to be ultimately in charge 
of the care their patients receive, and absent clear wrong-doing on the part of others, they will 
bear the responsibility when things go wrong. Since none of our cases involved medical errors 
resulting purely from nurse negligence, nor gross hospital mismanagement, we would expect this 
belief to be reflected in our findings. 
This finding, however, is not confirmed by our answers to the general blame questions at the 
beginning of the survey (discussed on page 19). Notably, when asked about frequency of 
contribution to medical errors from their own experiences, respondents collectively placed the 
highest frequency of contribution on nurses (mean value of 3.46±.068) while giving somewhat 
lower frequencies of contribution to physicians (means of 3.38±.072 and 3.11±.079 for residents 




threshold of statistical significance, and accordingly, rather than contradict the finding of our 
case-based data, we can more accurately say that they fail to confirm it.  
3. Hospital administrators placed more blame on the system and culture (non-
individual factors) than either physicians or nurses, and physicians placed more 
blame on these factors than nurses.  
This insight, as well, is not particularly surprising. In some sense, emphasis on the system was 
inversely proportional to direct time spent with patients. Conversely, and perhaps more 
compellingly, it was directly proportional to involvement with system-level issues. While 
administrators spend their time focusing on the creation and management of the system, 
physicians spend more of their time functioning at the patient level. And while physicians often 
care for patients across different units, as well as serve on hospital committees, many nurses’ 
experiences are limited to a single unit within the hospital. 
Part II: Differences in Blame Attribution Between Nurses, Physicians and Administrators 
4. Respondents’ role within the health care system was of significant predictive 
value in determining how they would assign blame for standardized cases.  
Perhaps the most important finding of our research is that when allocating blame for medical 
errors a person’s role within the health care system matters. Even when given the exact same 
information, nurses, physicians and administrators attribute accountability in consistently 
different ways. This was one of the central questions we set out to answer, and the data suggests 
that this is true with a high degree of certainty: across our data analysis we see statistically 
significant differences in how each of our three groups attributed blame among nurses, physicians 




non-individual factors and to nurses. Importantly, the differences observed between groups are 
consistent across the three cases. The insignificant p-values for blame allocated to physicians do 
not disprove this; they simply fail to confirm it. The p-value of .256 for the ANOVA of physician 
blame means that there is a 25.6% probability that the differences observed in this variable by 
group are due to chance, but conversely a 74.4% probability that they are not due to chance. 
One of the major weaknesses in this conclusion, however, is that we were not able to control for 
differences in age and gender between the groups, as we did not collect demographic information 
on age and gender. At the time we developed the survey we felt that given the small N we were 
expecting, this information would raise questions about maintaining respondents’ anonymity. In 
retrospect, this was a significant mistake on our part. Certain assumptions can be made about 
these variables, but the actual impact cannot be known without the demographic data.  
Nevertheless, assuming this finding is indeed valid, the reason for it warrants further exploration. 
The potential reasons are numerous, and the overall phenomena are likely multi-factorial in 
etiology, but one potential explanation warrants mention at this time, and that is the role of 
training. The education process for nurses, physicians and administrators is largely separate, and 
each is steeped in its own culture and professional values. It is possible that nurse training places 
more emphasis on personal accountability than either medical school or training programs in 
management. The converse is also potentially true: medical schools are increasingly emphasizing 
the roles of systems in the creation of errors, and this might be less true in nursing programs. 
Business and management programs, which administrators are much more likely to have 




above and beyond anything emphasized in the training programs for either physicians and 
nurses.4  
Part III: Blaming One’s Own versus Blaming Others 
5. Rather than blame one another, individuals within a given profession tended to 
place more blame on their own profession than other respondents placed on 
them.  
This statement requires some further explanation: while everyone blamed physicians more than 
nurses, the extent to which a given group blamed their own profession was greater than the extent 
to which other respondents blamed that group. This was among the most interesting findings of 
our study, and it contradicts our initial hypothesis that people would ultimately point fingers 
towards other people. The evidence for this tendency stretches across our analysis with a high 
degree of statistical significance. 
While this is evident in the raw data, our self-blame variable demonstrates this phenomenon more 
precisely. As explained before, this number was calculated as the ratio of an individual’s 
allocation of blame to his/her own position over the median value of blame attribution to his/her 
position across all respondents. The fact that self-blame scores averaged above 1.00 (1.20±0.50, 
N=85) confirms what we observe from the raw data, although it is noted that the 95% confidence 
interval places some limits on the level of confidence we can have about this statement. 
                                                     
4 While beyond the scope of this manuscript, this explanation is further supported by the fact that when physician 
assistants and APRN were analyzed separately, despite functioning at the target hospital very similarly to medical 
residents, their collective answers shared more in common with nurses than other physicians. APRNs, in particular, are 




It is also worth reconsidering what social psychology and attribution theory might elucidate about 
our findings. At first glance, our data seems to contradict the fundamental attribution error: 
respondents blamed their own professions more than others, whereas one might think that this 
theory would predict that people blamed others more than themselves. There is a key difference, 
however, between what we are asking and what attribution theory describes. Our self-blame 
analysis, while conveniently titled, is not actually measuring how much each person blames his or 
her self; rather, it is measuring how much the person blames others within their own profession. 
Accordingly, it is quite possible that respondents were actually processing behaviors through the 
lens of external attribution. We might reasonably suppose that when reading through the cases, 
respondents were more focused on the people within their own profession.  Accordingly, while 
the fundamental attribution error may have contributed to their tendency to blame individuals 
across all parties, it would have led them to do so even more for the people within their own 
profession, upon which their thoughts were more heavily focused. While we cannot know for 
certain at this stage exactly how to explain this finding, it is perhaps the most interesting lesson 
from our study, and should be among the central questions in future research. 
6. Nurses blamed themselves disproportionately more than physicians or 
administrators blamed themselves.  
This statement also requires some further explanation: while respondents overall 
disproportionately blamed themselves (compared to other respondents), the extent to which 
nurses did this was significantly greater than that of either physicians or nurses. The cross-case 
self-blame variable, which was statistically significant, verified this insight, suggesting that, on 




several possible explanations for this phenomenon.5 One potential reason, again, is the possibility 
that nurse education emphasizes personal responsibility more than medical or management 
training do. Further research is needed to determine if this is in fact true. Another possible 
explanation is the self-selection bias of people who chose to enter nursing. Again, proper analysis 
of this possibility is beyond the scope of this paper. Third, due to the nature of how they work, it 
is possible that nurses are (or at least believe they are) less aware of the details of physician work 
than vice versa. This may hold true with administrators as well: nurses may be less privy to 
discussions about systems thinking than either physicians or administrators, while administrators 
may feel they have a firmer grasp on the problems faced by nurses. Again, further research is 
needed to explore the potential answers to these questions. 
7. While still tending towards self-blame, physicians exhibited the least self-blame 
among the groups of respondents. 
This is admittedly an interesting and unexplained finding, and as with our other insights drawn 
from self-blame analysis, it is difficult to determine the explanation for what we are seeing. It is 
interesting to note, however, that many people believe physicians to be strong self-blamers. In a 
2008 article in JAMA Christakis explains this as follows [14]: 
Yet after more than a decade of telling doctors that medical errors principally originate in 
the system, most doctors I know still do feel personally responsible when bad things 
happen to their patients, even if, in fact, they did nothing wrong! They still take the 
blame. 
                                                     
5 We must note that by virtue of the way it was calculated, this number is inherently biased by our population sample, 
since it uses the medians of all respondents. Since we had twice as many physician respondents as nursing respondents, 
the median values used in our calculations are somewhat skewed towards the blame attribution of the physicians. We 
can therefore expect the magnitude of the self-blame variable for nurses to be somewhat exaggerated, since this 
compares their blame allocation to the medians, which underemphasize their own pattern of blame allocation. While 
this might diminish the magnitude of the difference, it does not change the overall direction of the difference: even if 





He then goes on to ask why this is the case. He argues this is because “the flip side of blame is 
credit. Since our interventions are powerful enough to save patients, adverse outcomes must also 
be the result of human agency... Physicians can be held to higher account. And they want to be 
held to higher account.” We should state that our research does not contradict this—it still 
demonstrates a tendency towards self-blame among physicians. But the significantly lower ratio 
of self-blame felt by physicians than by either nurses or administrators is nonetheless revealing, 
and is worthy of future investigation.  
3.2 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS OF OUR RESEARCH 
Perceived Strengths of Our Research 
There are two potential weakness in our research that we believe we handled well, and 
accordingly consider to be strengths in our research. The first is the estimated validity of our 
survey. Given its length and complexity, we were particularly concerned that people may not be 
able to give the entire survey the attention it required or fully understand what was being asked. 
We addressed this issue by asking a series of validity questions, which were generated in 
consultation with an expert in survey design and asked at the completion of the survey. These 
questions included a Likert scale rating of agreement or disagreement with the following three 
questions: (1) I understood the survey directions and questions; (2) This survey was too long; and 
(3) I was able to spend the time I needed in order to give thoughtful answers. While there was 
notable agreement (40%) that survey was too long, and a significant percentage of people (39%) 
agreed with the statement “I was tired by the end of the survey,” only a small minority (4%) of 
respondents disagreed with the statement “I was able to spend the time I needed to give honest 
answers”. Furthermore, only a small minority (5%) of people reported not agreeing or strongly 




The other main strength in our research was the perceived realism of our cases. We used our 
focus groups to assess respondents’ perception of the realism of our cases. While we have not 
formally analyzed the data we collected on this, we consistently heard from all participants that 
our cases were highly realistic. When asked to numerically rate them on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 
being “could never happen” and 5 being “happened yesterday,” we consistently were told the 
cases were either a 4 or a 5. The only part of the cases deemed unrealistic was the final outcome 
of the patient in CASE #2, who has a major stroke only weeks after being discharged without her 
Coumadin. Some participants felt that this was exceedingly unlikely, but felt that the case up to 
that point (including all of the medical errors made) was still highly realistic. 
Potential Weaknesses in Our Research 
The N is relatively small. While we anticipated a limited N due to the length of the survey, this 
remains a weakness of our analysis. Our tests of statistical significance suggest that most of the 
conclusions we were able to draw have a moderately high degree of confidence, despite the low 
N, but this nonetheless remains a weakness of our study.  
Hidden variables and lack of proper demographic control variables. It is entirely possible that 
there exists significant factors that explain the phenomena we have observed that we have failed 
to control for. The most significant of these factors are the key demographic variables of gender 
and age, which as previously mentioned, were not recorded in our survey (we did collect tenure in 
position and tenure at the hospital, but not age). Given the strong correlation of gender with a 
health professional’s role within health care (with nurses being >90% female, and physicians 
being almost evenly split) it is entirely plausible that some of the phenomena we have observed 
can be attributed to gender rather than to role. We do not believe that this is the case, but we have 




Survey responses may not accurately reflect the survey participants true beliefs. This might be 
true for several reasons. First, the survey was considered too long by a significant number of 
respondents (39%), and a significant percentage (40%) of respondents reported that by the end of 
the survey they were tired.  
Our cases might unfairly bias readers towards individuals instead of the system. As discussed 
on page 34, by virtue of how they were written, our cases might place more emphasis on 
individuals than on system factors. Two facts point away from this, however: (1) our cases earned 
high scores of realism in our focus groups (as discussed on page 34); and (2) when reading the 
same cases, administrators believed that systems played a larger role. 
Validity of answers might not be consistent across all cases and questions. This is especially an 
issue with nurse respondents, since there was considerable pressure placed by nurse managers on 
staff nurses to complete the survey, and most of them completed this while at work. They 
therefore may have started the survey, been distracted, and then later returned to it, likely 
diminishing the quality of the later answers.  
Participation in focus groups may have influenced some survey responses. Some of the surveys 
were collected after the respondent had participated in focus groups. A minority (roughly 10%) of 
focus group participants reported changing their answers during the focus groups. When asked 
about these changes, they indicated that their change was a result of a change in their 
understanding of the survey, not due to the influence of hearing other focus group participants. 
This holds especially true for questions involving “hospital culture,” which was repeatedly 




There may have been errors with the data entry of the paper surveys. These might stem from 
those participants who elected to take the survey online, as well as by our own data entry. Overall 
we believe it is unlikely any potential such errors had a material impact on our findings. 
Other Possible Weaknesses: While not discussed in detail, additional possible weaknesses of our 
study include different response rates by group (as discussed on page 16), the inherent self-
selection bias involved with our recruitment efforts, and finally the fact that our entire study was 
limited to a single institution.  
3.3 CONCLUSIONS: REVISITING OUR HYPOTHESES 
In this section we discuss the conclusions we can draw from our research, as well as their 
potential significance to both future research on quality of care and quality improvement efforts. 
Hypothesis #1: Despite a shift towards systems-based thinking, health care professionals will 
blame individuals rather than the system for medical errors.  
This hypothesis was somewhat supported by our research. Overall, our analyses demonstrated 
that when given concrete cases, people held individuals more accountable than the system. This 
finding, however, is offset by the fact that when asked about contribution to medical errors in 
general, from their own experiences, they placed slightly more weight on the contribution of 
systems than on the contribution of individuals. It is further limited by the fact that our 
standardized cases—while widely regarded as realistic—may have over-emphasized individuals’ 
role in each part of the errors, and underemphasized the potential (but missing) system 
components that could have prevented the errors. 
Hypothesis #2: Even when given the exact same information, health care professionals will 
allocate blame or accountability for medical errors differently depending on their role in the 




This hypothesis was significantly supported by our research. Our analyses demonstrated 
significant statistical differences in the answers given between professions. While the possibility 
of hidden variables—most notably age and gender—need to be considered, our feeling is that 
these would not fully account for the phenomena we have seen. 
Hypothesis #3: In general, health care professionals will allocate blame disproportionately 
towards other professions rather than blame their own professions. 
This hypothesis was significantly disproved by our research. Multiple analyses, several with 
considerable levels of statistical significance, suggested that in fact people tend to blame their 
own profession more than others blame them. This was especially true among nurses, but least 
true among physicians. 
3.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS  
The significance of these findings for the field of health care services might be considerable. 
Until now, little was known about how people assign blame in health care. Given the 
extraordinary emphasis placed on moving past the culture of blame, it is important to understand 
how people go about assigning blame. Our hope at this time is to distill these findings into a 
research article for publication, which will allow us to bring these findings to the larger health 
services research community. Discussion with health services researchers about our research thus 
far will likely be central in deciding where to go with future research efforts. 
The significance of these findings on health care management might be considerable as well. It is 
important to note, however, that managers are ultimately interested in influencing behavior. Our 
study, at this time, is primarily focused on understanding how people think rather than how they 
behave. The ultimate implications of this research on influencing behavior, however, may be 




participation with quality improvement efforts. The enthusiasm with which people embrace such 
quality improvement efforts likely depends, to some extent, on who they feel is ultimately 
responsible for the underlying problems the quality improvement efforts is addressing. 
Furthermore, if people harbor resentment over feeling wrongly blamed for the problem being 
addressed, they may be less inclined to support its success. Accordingly, insights into how 
different members of their staffs assign blame to one another for issues relating to quality of care 
may help health care managers in their efforts to recruit support for quality of care initiatives. 
More research is needed, however, to fully understand the importance of these findings on health 
care administration. 
3.5 THOUGHTS ON FUTURE RESEARCH 
As mentioned in the introduction, this manuscript represents only a pilot study of our dataset and 
these questions. If the findings from this study are considered to be interesting and valid, we 
expect to continue this research through additional analyses of our dataset, as well as possible 
further administration of our survey. Ideally we would be able to revise our survey both to make 
it more precise as well as significantly shorter, since the length of the survey was the primary 
obstacle to obtaining a larger sample size. If we continue this research, we would also consider 
expanding our target population either beyond just the medicine units of Yale-New Haven 
Hospital, or to another institution altogether. Finally, we would want to expand the scope of our 
inquiry to include at least initial research into the multiple potential explanations for our key 





1. Kohn, L.T., J. Corrigan, and M.S. Donaldson, To err is human : building a safer health 
system. 2000, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. xxi, 287 p. 
2. Oxford, Oxford English Dictionary (online edition). 2005. 
3. Leape, L.W., DD; Hatlie, MJ; et al., Promoting Patient Safety by Preventing Medical 
Error. Journal of the American Medical Association, 1998. 280(16): p. 1444-1446. 
4. Runciman, W.e.a., Error, Blame, and the Law in Health Care—An Antipodean 
Perspective. Annals of Internal Medicine, 2003. 138: p. 974-979. 
5. Campion, E., A Death at Duke. New Engl J Med, 2003. 348(12): p. 1083-1084. 
6. Studdert, D., and Brennan, TA, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries: The 
Prospect for Error Prevention. Journal of the American Medical Association, 2001. 286: 
p. 217-223. 
7. Hsia, D., Medicare Quality Improvement. Journal of the American Medical Association, 
2003. 289(3): p. 354-356. 
8. Phillips, D., “New Look” Reflects Changing Style of Patient Safety Enhancement. Journal 
of the American Medical Association, 1999. 281(3): p. 217-219. 
9. Reason, J.T., Human error. 1990, Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. xv, 302 p. 
10. Berwick, D.M., Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care. New England 
Journal of Medicine, 1989. 
11. Wacther, R., The End of the Beginning: Patient Safety Five Years After 'To Err is 
Human'. Health Aff, 2004. Web Exclusive(W4): p. 534-545. 
12. Bordens, K.S., and Horowitz, Irwin A., Social Psychology. 2000: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Incorporated. 
13. Goldmann, D., System Failure versus Personal Accountability —The Case for Clean 
Hands. New Engl J Med, 2006. 355(2): p. 120-122. 
















YNHH Patient Safety Accountability Survey (Paper Edition)
Welcome, and thank you for agreeing to take this survey! 
This survey is part of a research project on understanding people's beliefs about accountability for medical errors. 
The core of this survey consists of three brief clinical vignettes. After each vignette you are asked to assign blame, 
or accountability, for the outcome among the key players and causes. The goal of this study is to understand how 
people assign accountability differently when given the same information. Across this survey, the term "blame" is 
used synonymously with accountability, responsibility and fault. 
Don't hesitate to contact me at stephen.gordon@yale.edu if you have any questions. 
Thank you again for your help! 
Stephen Gordon 
1. Please enter any 7 digit number, as well as any word, and write them down for 
future reference. We will use this number to track your results and to announce the 
raffle winners. Your survey answers will remain anonymous.
2. What is your current position within the hospital?
3. How long have you been in your current position?












































Attending Physician (Hospitalist 
Service)
nmlkj






















More than 21 years
 
nmlkj
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5. Which units do you regularly work on?
Before we start the cases, we want to ask you a few questions about how you generally view accountability for 
medical errors. 
For the sake of this survey, a medical error is defined as a preventable adverse event. The IOM further defines a 
medical error as "the failure to complete a planned action as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim." 
An adverse event is defined as "an injury caused by medical management rather than by the underlying disease or 
condition of the patient." Some adverse events are not preventable and they reflect the risk associated with 
treatment, such as a life-threatening allergic reaction to a drug when the patient had no known allergies to it. 
However, the patient who receives an antibiotic to which he or she is known to be allergic, goes into anaphylactic 
shock, and dies, represents a preventable adverse event. 
These brief questions ask you to think of medical errors as having three categories of root causes: 
1) Individuals (nurses and physicians)
2) System (computer system, internal processes, etc.)
3) Culture (staff's beliefs, fears, organizational values, etc.)
6. Thinking through your own experience with medical errors, what role do you 
believe the following root causes play in creating the error?
7. In cases where an individual is to blame, how often is each of the following parties 
responsible?












Individuals (nurses, physicians, etc.) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
System (computer system, internal processes, etc.) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Culture (staff's beliefs, fears, organizational values, 
etc.)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Frequently
Patient care associates nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Technical staff (phlebotomists, radiology techs, etc.) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nurses (RNs) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
PSMs/Nurse Managers nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
PAs/APRNs nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Resident Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Attending Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Mid-Level Hospital Administrators (Directors) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Hospital Administrators (chief executive officer, chief 
operating officer, chief nursing officer, medical chief of staff)
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8. In the cases where the system is to blame, how often is each of the following 
components to blame?
9. In the cases where the hospital culture is to blame, how often is each of the 
following components to blame?
10. Who do you consider responsible for hospital systems? 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Usually
Workload/staffing balance nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of time for training nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Computer system nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Communication systems (phones, pagers) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Physical hospital layout nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Excess documentation nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Poor quality of training nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Intradepartmental processes (within departments) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Interdepartmental processes (between departments) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Usually
Lack of open communication among nurses nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of open communication between nurses and physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of staff input into work processes nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Concern over staff consequences of involvement in medical errors nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
A culture of blame or finger-pointing nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
A culture of or emphasis on cost containment nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Other 
_________________________________________________________
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
We are interested in understanding how people ultimately assign accountability for patient safety among different individuals. 










Nurses nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nurse Managers nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Hospital 
Administrators
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Board of Trustees nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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11. Who do you consider responsible for hospital culture? 
The rest of this survey consists of three brief clinical vignettes designed to get you to think about accountability for 
medical errors. At the end of each case you will be asked a short set of questions. 
The first and most important of these questions asks you to divide accountability for the patient's outcome among 
four root causes: physicians, nurses, system, and culture. This is done in two steps: first, by dividing between 
individuals versus non-individuals; then, by further subdividing individuals between physicians and nurses, and non-
individuals between systems and culture. This is illustrated in the diagram below. 
Please read the cases carefully keeping this goal in mind. This question asks you to assign accountability in terms of 
100 percentage points. Your values should therefore total to 100%. Assign 0% for any party or component you feel 
does not bear any accountability. 
Finally, you are asked to highlight who or what within each of these four categories you consider most responsible. 
Finally you will be asked to indicate how empowered you feel the different groups are to prevent the outcome from 
happening again. 
Causes outside of the hospital (such as lack of sufficient government reimbursement or regulation) should not be 
included in this analysis, nor should any fault borne by the patient him or herself. 
Mr. Smith is a 72-year-old man with a history of lung cancer and COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) who 
presents to the emergency department (ED) with shortness of breath and cough for 3 days. His lung cancer was 
first diagnosed 3 years prior and was treated initially with a surgical wedge resection of the left lower lobe. The full 
records are unavailable at this time, since it was at an outside hospital.
On exam he has a blood pressure of 110/60, a pulse of 105, and an oxygen saturation of 95%. His lung exam is 
clear, other than mildly decreased breath sounds on the left side. The remainder of his exam is benign. An EKG 
shows no acute abnormalities, and a chest x-ray is consistent with his prior surgery but shows no other 
abnormalities.
The ED physician reviews the patient’s incomplete medical record and notes that he had previously been admitted 
for similar complaints, which after workup were thought just to be a result of his cancer and COPD. However, given 
his rapid pulse and low blood pressure, the physician wants to make sure this is not a pulmonary embolism, and so 
he enters an order in the computer system for a CT angiography but does not specify the reason. Heparin is not 
ordered at this time. The radiology department, which is exceptionally busy that night, does not come for Mr. Smith 






Nurses nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nurse Managers nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Hospital 
Administrators
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Board of Trustees nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
4. THE CASES: INTRODUCTION
5. CASE #1 - MR. SMITH
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until 2 hours later, at which time Mr. Smith is having a chest x-ray. When they return for him an hour later he has 
already been transferred to the floor.
The admitting team read the ED record that states: “Pt with known history of lung malignancy and prior admissions 
for SOB/cough now presenting with similar symptoms, admit for medical management.” Similarly busy, the admitting 
team only briefly skims through the ED record. They see that the CTA was ordered. They conclude that the ED team 
did a thorough workup and proceed with the belief that this is a COPD exacerbation complicated by his prior surgery, 
and decide that they will contact his surgical oncologist in the morning and follow up on the CTA whenever it 
becomes available in the computer system. They admit him with just basic orders for supportive measures, including 
IV fluids, albuterol/atrovent nebulizers, and pain medications, and hold off on any other orders until the next 
morning.
At 8:00 PM the night of admission the patient becomes hypoxic to an oxygen saturation of 89%. The alarm goes off 
but the nurse, Sally, who is upset that she has not been told anything about the patient nor given full admission 
orders, decides to follow what is written, which does not specify any range below which to contact the medical 
team.
At 1:00 AM the patient desaturates to 75%. The nurse shift has changed, and the nurse who is now on duty, 
Jessica, is on her first day on the job after training. She panics and runs out of the patient’s room to find the charge 
nurse, Michelle. Because it is her first day, Jessica has already come to Michelle with many urgent requests that 
have proven to not be that urgent. Jessica tells Michelle that the patient is “more short of breath” but does not 
specifically state the patient’s oxygen saturation level. Michelle assures Jessica she will be there shortly. Michelle 
comes to the patient’s room within 10 minutes. At that point the patient is unconscious and has desaturated to 
50%. A respiratory code is called and Mr. Smith is intubated, and transferred to the ICU.
In the ICU Mr. Smith's chart is reviewed and it is discovered that the CTA was never performed. A stat CTA is 
ordered which shows a massive pulmonary embolism.
Mr. Smith spends the next week in the ICU on a ventilator. The ICU has not yet implemented the recommended 
guidelines for prevention of ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP), and accordingly the head of his bed is not 
elevated. Over the next few days Mr. Smith continues to decline, his chest x-rays show increasingly infiltrates, and 
he becomes febrile. Three days later he dies of a presumed VAP.
12. ASSIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY (Individuals versus Non-Individuals)
How would you divide accountability or responsibility for the errors that led to this 
patient’s outcome between individuals versus the hospital system and culture?  
Remember that your total must equal 100%.
13. ASSIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY (Among Individuals)
Among the part that you attributed to individuals in the previous question, how 
would you divide accountability or responsibility between the nurses and the 
physicians? 
Remember that your total must equal 100%.
Individuals (Physicians and Nurses) (%)
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14. ASSIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY (Among Non-Individuals) 
Among the part that you attributed to non-individuals, how would you divide 
accountability or responsibility between the hospital system and hospital culture?
Remember that your total must equal 100%.
15. Among the physicians:
16. Among the nursing staff:
17. Among components of the hospital system:
Hospital System (including computer systems, communication 
systems, internal processes, etc.) (%)
Hospital Culture (including staff beliefs, institutional values, 
etc.) (%)
In the next 4 questions please indicate how you would divide the accountability or responsibility among the individual people or 






Very accountable Solely accountable
Emergency Department Physician nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Intern nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Resident nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj






Very accountable Solely accountable
The Patient’s 1st Nurse (Sally) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
The Patient's 2nd Nurse (Jessica) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj









Information Technology System (computer 
system)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Communication System (phones, paging, 
etc.)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Intradepartmental Processes (within 
departments)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Interdepartmental Processes (between 
departments)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Workload nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Training/Orientation nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Other (please specify) 
________________________________________
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 9 
Page 7
YNHH Patient Safety Accountability Survey (Paper Edition)
18. Among components of hospital culture:
19. To what extent can the following people take actions that would prevent this 
scenario from happening again?
Mrs. Jones is a 73-year-old woman with a history of paroxysmal atrial fibrillation and sick sinus syndrome who is on a 
stable dose of Coumadin. She is admitted for an elective pacemaker placement. Her Coumadin is stopped in 
advance, and her procedure takes place without complications.
On the day of discharge the hospital is at full capacity and the emergency department is backed up, and there is 
significant pressure to free up beds on the floor early. Mrs. Jones' medical team needs to discharge five patients. 
The senior resident needs to start working up some new admissions, so the attending physician and the intern work 
on the discharges. Since Mrs. Jones is among their least critical cases, the attending physician asks the intern to 
finish up her discharge orders and discharge her. The hospital's computer system, however, does not have any way 
of reconciling a patient's original, inpatient, and discharge medications. Accordingly, the intern discharges Mrs. Jones 
only on her inpatient medications and does not restart her Coumadin.
The patient’s nurse, Susan, who is similarly rushed that morning, only quickly reviews the discharge instructions and 
makes a 2-minute call to the home health agency which will follow the patient for the next week. The nurse at the 
home health agency asks about Mrs. Jones' medications, and Susan replies, “I’m sorry, but I’m absolutely swamped. 









Culture of Cost Containment nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Culture of Blame or Finger-Pointing nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Communication among Nurses nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Communication among Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Communication between Nurses and 
Physicians
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Staff Input into Processes nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Other (please specify) 
_____________________________________________
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
No real ability to 
prevent
Limited ability to 
prevent




Sole ability to 
prevent
Junior Residents (Interns/PGY-1) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Resident Physicians (PGY-2 and 
PGY-3)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Attending Physicians (Hospitalist and 
Faculty)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Emergency Department Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Patient Care Associates (PCAs) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nurses (RNs) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Charge Nurses nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nurse Managers nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nursing Directors nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
The Hospital's Chief of Medical Staff nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Information Systems Department nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Hospital Administrators nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
The Hospital’s Board of Trustees nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
6. CASE #2 - MRS. JONES
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see her, as well as her discharge summary, which we are sending to you and her primary physician." The discharge 
summary, however, has insufficient contact information, and fails to arrive at either the home health agency or the 
primary care physician's office.
Due to the rush, an appointment with Mrs. Jones' primary physician is not scheduled. The discharge instructions tell 
her to make one at her earliest convenience. They also include a list of her discharge medications and the directive 
to “stop taking any other medications not listed here.” Since her Coumadin is not on the list, she refrains from taking 
it.
Later that week, before visiting Mrs. Jones, a nurse from the home health agency calls Mrs. Jones' primary care 
physician, Dr. Miller, to confirm her medications and home health needs. Dr. Miller, however, is on vacation, and Dr. 
Roberts, who is covering for her, is not familiar with the case. He looks for a discharge summary but nothing has 
arrived. Without any information, he tells the nurse to go ahead with the discharge instructions and to have Mrs. 
Jones make a follow-up appointment with Dr. Miller when she is back.
Three weeks later, Mrs. Jones suffers a stroke that leaves her in a permanently vegetative state.
20. ASSIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY (Individuals versus Non-Individuals)
How would you divide accountability or responsibility for the errors that led to this 
patient’s outcome between individuals versus the hospital system and culture?  
Remember that your total must equal 100%.
21. ASSIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY (Among Individuals)
Among the part that you attributed to individuals in the previous question, how 
would you divide accountability or responsibility between the nurses and the 
physicians? 
Remember that your total must equal 100%.
22. ASSIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY (Among Non-Individuals) 
Among the part that you attributed to non-individuals, how would you divide 
accountability or responsibility between the hospital system and hospital culture?
Remember that your total must equal 100%.
Individuals (Physicians and Nurses) (%)
Non-Individuals (Hospital System and Culture) (%)
Physicians (%)
Nurses (%)
Hospital System (including computer systems, communication 
systems, internal processes, etc.) (%)
Hospital Culture (including staff beliefs, institutional values, 
etc.) (%)
In the next 4 questions please indicate how you would divide the accountability or responsibility among the individual people or 
components within each of the categories above.
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23. Among the physicians:
24. Among the nursing staff:
25. Among components of the hospital system:






Very accountable Solely accountable
Intern nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Resident nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Attending Physician nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Primary Care Physician (Dr. Miller) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj






Very accountable Solely accountable
The Patient’s Nurse (Susan) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj









Information Technology System (computer 
system)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Communication System (phones, paging, etc.) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Intradepartmental Processes (within 
departments)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Interdepartmental Processes (between 
departments)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Workload nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Training/Orientation nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Other (please specify) 
_____________________________________________









Culture of Cost Containment nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Culture of Blame or Finger-Pointing nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Communication among Nurses nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Communication among Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Communication between Nurses and 
Physicians
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Staff Input into Processes nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Other (please specify) 
_____________________________________________
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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27. To what extent can the following people take actions that would prevent this 
scenario from happening again?
Mr. Rogers is a 75-year-old man admitted for meningitis. Mr. Rogers is lethargic and confused and is not able to 
answer any of the questions he is asked. He is given IV fluids and started on Cefotaxime, 2g, every 6 hours, 
beginning with his first dose at 6:00 PM.
At 9:00 PM, his nurse, Mary, asks him how he is feeling, and he tells her that his "skin is hurting a little." She looks 
him over and tells him to tell her if it becomes worse. At 10:30 pm Mr. Rogers’ pain is getting worse and so he rings 
for the nurse. Mary, however, is now taking care of another patient who has become hypotensive and has lost his 
IV access. She asks another nurse, Jane, to check on Mr. Rogers. Jane checks on him and makes a mental note to 
tell Mary that Mr. Rogers' pain is getting worse. However, at the shift change at 11:00 PM, Mary is still with her 
hypotensive patient, and by the time Mary finally signs out Jane has already left, so the message never gets 
through.
At 11:30 PM Mary finally signs out to John, the oncoming (night shift) nurse. She is exhausted, worried about her 
hypotensive patient, and now running late to pick up her son from his babysitter. In signing out she forgets to 
mention that Mr. Rogers had complained about his skin hurting earlier that evening.
At midnight Mr. Rogers is given a second dose of Cefotaxime. He sleeps through the rest of the night. At 6 am, when 
John comes in to give him is third dose of Cefotaxime, he tells John that his skin is still hurting. This is the first John 
has heard of this, and after looking him over, he decides that he will mention it to the medical team when they 
round, which is usually by 8:00 AM.
During rounds the medical team recognizes that he might be having a drug reaction. They check his records but do 
not see documentation of any allergies, but they decide to stop his Cefotaxime. The intern, who is on her first 
month on the wards, writes this instruction down on her to-do list (they do not have a computer with them). 
However, rounds run late, and right after rounds finish she needs to run intern report at 10:00 AM and to go on 
attending rounds at 11:00 AM. By the time she finally enters in the order to discontinue the Cefotaxime, it is 12:30 
PM, and Mr. Rogers has already gotten a fourth dose.
By 6:00 PM that evening Mr. Rogers' pain is continuing to get worse, and he is beginning to develop blisters. The 
resident asks about the Cefotaxime order, and the intern apologizes and tells him that it was discontinued, but not 
before the patient got a fourth dose. Since Mr. Rogers’ memory is poor, and he has no family with him, they decide 
 
No real ability to 
prevent
Limited ability to 
prevent




Sole ability to 
prevent
Junior Residents (Interns/PGY-1) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Resident Physicians (PGY-2 and 
PGY-3)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Attending Physicians (Hospitalist and 
Faculty)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Emergency Department Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Patient Care Associates (PCAs) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nurses (RNs) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Charge Nurses nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nurse Managers nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nursing Directors nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
The Hospital's Chief of Medical Staff nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Information Systems Department nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Hospital Administrators nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
The Hospital’s Board of Trustees nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
7. CASE #3 - MR. ROGERS
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to call his primary care physician, Dr. Johnson. Upon hearing what has happened Dr. Johnson gets quite angry and 
yells, “Mr. Rogers has a known allergy to cephalosporins! It is documented in his medical chart. How could you not 
have checked?” The team reviews the inpatient electronic medical record and finds no history of any allergies. The 
resident, who has just done a block on the outpatient clinic, thinks to check the outpatient electronic medical 
record, which is a completely different system at this hospital, and finds a documented history of an "allergic or 
other type reaction" to cephalosporins with a note saying "previous history of SJS with cephalosporins."
The team realizes that Mr. Rogers is developing Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and they start him on high-dose 
steroids. Despite the treatment, his condition progresses, and his skin begins to desquamate. Over the next three 
days he becomes increasingly febrile and hemodynamically unstable and is transferred to the ICU with suspected 
sepsis. Blood cultures grow out staphylococcus (an infection clearly acquired within the hospital facilitated by the 
breakdown of the patient's skin). Two days later, Mr. Rogers dies of overwhelming sepsis.
28. ASSIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY (Individuals versus Non-Individuals)
How would you divide accountability or responsibility for the errors that led to this 
patient’s outcome between individuals versus the hospital system and culture?  
Remember that your total must equal 100%.
29. ASSIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY (Among Individuals)
Among the part that you attributed to individuals in the previous question, how 
would you divide accountability or responsibility between the nurses and the 
physicians? 
Remember that your total must equal 100%.
30. ASSIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY (Among Non-Individuals)
Among the part that you attributed to non-individuals, how would you divide 
accountability or responsibility between the hospital system and hospital culture?
Remember that your total must equal 100%.
Individuals (Physicians and Nurses) (%)
Non-Individuals (Hospital System and Culture) (%)
Physicians (%)
Nurses (%)
Hospital System (including computer systems, communication 
systems, internal processes, etc.)
Hospital Culture (including staff beliefs, institutional values, 
etc.)
In the next 4 questions please indicate how you would divide the accountability or responsibility among the individual people or 
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31. Among the physicians:
32. Among the nursing staff:
33. Among components of the hospital system?






Very accountable Solely accountable
Intern nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Resident nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Attending Physician nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj






Very accountable Solely accountable
The Patient’s Day-Shift Nurse (Mary) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
The Other Day-Shift Nurse (Jane) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
The Patient's Night-Shift Nurse (John) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj









Information Technology System (computer 
system)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Communication System (phones, paging, etc.) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Intradepartmental Processes (within 
departments)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Interdepartmental Processes (between 
departments)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Workload nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Training/Orientation nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Other (please specify) 
_____________________________________________









Culture of Cost Containment nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Culture of Blame or Finger-Pointing nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Communication among Nurses nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Communication among Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Communication between Nurses and 
Physicians
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Lack of Staff Input into Processes nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Other (please specify) 
_____________________________________________
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35. To what extent can the following people take actions that would prevent this 
scenario from happening again?
Thank you for completing this survey! Please take just another minute to answer a few final questions.
36. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements:
37. Would you be interested in participating in a focus group with your peers 
regarding these cases?
38. How long did it take you to complete this survey?
 
No real ability to 
prevent
Limited ability to 
prevent




Sole ability to 
prevent
Junior Residents (Interns) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Resident Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Attending Physicians 
(Hospitalist/Faculty)
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Emergency Department Physicians nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Patient Care Associates (PCAs) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nurses (RNs) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Charge Nurses nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nurse Managers nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Nursing Directors nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
The Hospital's Chief of Medical Staff nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Information Systems Department nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Senior Hospital Administrators nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj





Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
I understood the survey directions and questions. nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
This survey was too long. nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
I was able to spend the time I needed in order to 
give thoughtful answers.
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP!
You can either enter your answers online at:
http://tinyurl.com/ynhh-survey 
or place this survey in one of the collection boxes or envelopes in the 9th Floor Conference Room, outside Grace Jenq's office (5th 
Floor, East Pavilion), or outside John Sward and Marcy DeMarco's office (9th floor, East Pavilion). Thank you!



















APPENDIX B: CALCULATION OF VARIABLES 
There were 194 variables in the raw data, of which 7 were administrative (IP address, 
start time, respondent identification), leaving us with 187 significant variables. A total of 
87 new variables were calculated (outlined below) leaving us with a sum total of 281 
variables in our analysis. The calculations used in creating our key new variables are 
outlined below: 
1. The demographic variable of position was mapped to three primary groups 
(nurses, physicians, and administrators). Dummy variables (0 or 1) were created 
for each of these categories to allow for statistical analysis. 
2. The general (non-case based) blame attribution variables were calculated by 
taking the means of the relevant responses to question #6 and #7. 
3. Blame attribution values for the four end-targets (nurses, physicians, hospital 
system and hospital culture) were calculated as follows: 
a. Nurse %: Individual % x Nurse % 
b. Physician %: Individual % x Physician % 
c. Hospital System %: Non-Individual % x Hospital System % 
d. Hospital Culture %: Non-Individual % x Hospital Culture % 
4. Case-wide blame attribution was then calculated by taking the mean of the 
individual components of the respondent’s net case blame attribution. 
5. The self-blame ratio was calculated for each of the three cases by dividing the 
individual respondent’s blame attribution to his/her own position by the median of 
all respondents’ blame attribution to that position. This was achieved by taking 
the sum of the products of the individuals blame attribution times the dummy 
variables (0 or 1) for each of the three positions divided by the median values for 




















































APPENDIX D: BLAME VECTORS 
Throughout much of our analysis we thought of our data in terms of vectors, and we had 
originally planned to present our findings in vector format. For the interested reader, a 
brief discussion of this way of thinking about our data is presented in this appendix. A 
graphically representation of our data as vectors follows.  
Vector Basics 
In the simplest terms, vectors can be thought of as just columns of numbers. What we 
think of as a normal number (5, 6, etc.) are really just one-dimensional vectors 
(sometimes called scalars). We would represent the number [60%] as follows: 
 
If we place a 40% on top of the 60%, now we have a two dimensional vector. [60, 40] 
 
Vectors as a Method for Modeling Blame 
The reason we decided to use vectors to model blame was simple: blame, like a vector, 
has both magnitude and direction—it points towards something. If we were going to ask 
people how they attributed blame across multiple causes, we needed a way of thinking 
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about their collective set of answers to these questions. We therefore developed the 
concept of the “blame vector”, which, in its simplest form, is just the series of numbers 
representing how that person assigns 100 percentage points of blame. 
If we stick to only two dimensions at a time, it is easy to visualize how this might work. 
Below are blame vectors consistent with our hypothesis that every group will point blame 
away from themselves: physicians will blame nurses, nurses will blame physicians, both 
will blame the system, and administrators will blame both physicians and nurses.  
 
It is important to note that both of these pictures are really just projections of the same set 
of vectors (the hypothetical administrator, nurse, and physician). The figure on the left 
represents a projection onto the system-individual plane, while the figure on the right 
represents a projection onto the nurse-physician plane. 
Let us now consider the full three-dimensional vector, such as the ones we will consider 
in our analysis. To visualize this we combine the two projections of the vector above: we 
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take the projection on the right and add an individual-system axis to it which is 
perpendicular to both the physician and nurse axes (orthogonal): 
 
Now we will add our three-dimensional vector to this set of axes: 
 
 24 
While it is impossible to imagine graphically, we could just as easily move on to a four-
dimensional vector, which would split out hospital system and hospital culture. In fact, 
vectors can exist in as many dimensions as we want. In our analysis we are going to deal 
with 2-, 3-, and 4-dimensional vectors only.  
Building Our Vectors 




As discussed in Chapter 1, the reason we had people break this down into two steps was 
our belief—confirmed through conversations with potential survey respondents—that 
directly dividing blame into four components was difficult to do. Our fear was that 
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making sure the four components totaled to exactly 100% would divert mental effort 
away from the primary task of allocating blame. 
The breakdown we established is summarized in the model below: 
 
While respondents provided raw percentages as their answers, our analysis includes a 
hierarchy of calculated variables that are in essence the reverse of our survey 
construction: from the survey questions we work our way back up to the central 
questions of our research. An overview of the structure of our analysis is provided in the 
diagram below. 
 26 
Accordingly, to answer our research questions we needed to reconstruct our original 
quest—the 4-dimensional “blame” vector—from this raw case-based data. This meant 
integrating back up to our net vectors, by multiplying back through the initial individuals 
versus non-individuals divide. Suppose someone attributed overall blame 60% to 
individuals and 40% to non-individuals. Then, in the individuals question, attributed 80% 
to physicians, and 20% to nurses, and in the non-individuals question attributed a 50/50 
split between hospital systems and hospital culture. Their resulting blame attribution 
would be 48% physicians, 12% to nurses, and 20% each to hospital systems and culture. 
These resulting numbers are referred to as the “net blame” vector. 
Since we had also decided that one standardized case would not be sufficient to measure 
a respondent’s feelings towards this subject, we had to also average across the three 
 27 
cases. This left us with two different directions we needed to calculate: up across all the 
cases, and up towards the net values. Accordingly, the underlying data actually consisted 
of four distinct sets of vectors, as demonstrated below: 
 
Note that when both of these calculations are done, the “net” (rightward) calculation must 
be done first, since this needs to occur at the level of the individual case. In other words, 
we want to sum our nets, not net our sums. Then both the raw and net individual case 
vectors can be averaged across all three cases (upwards). 
These four sets of vectors—raw case, net case, raw case-wide, and net case-wide—form 
the core of our analysis. In this manuscript, however, we focused on presenting only the 
net vectors, since these were the most readily understandable, as one could easily see how 
they summed up to 100%. 
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Vector Representation of Our Data: The Raw Vectors 
For the interested reader, the data from our analysis is presented on the following page in 
vector form. Each vector from each of the three cases is provided for the individual 
versus non-individual and physician versus nurse divisions. Because these are 3-
dimensional vectors, we present each one in two diagrams, each of which represents a 
two-dimensional projection of the same underlying vector. Since each divide required the 
respondent’s answers to sum to 100%, all of the vectors at this level are the same length.1 
As the divide between hospital system and hospital culture was statistically 
insignificant at this level of the analysis, it is not included.  
                                                 
1 Note that due to averaging, some vectors slightly cross the 100% line; the vectors are 





Vector Representation of Our Data: The Net Vectors 
As explained before, our net vectors were created by multiplying through the first level 
divide between individuals and non-individuals. The net case vectors therefore give a 
four-part divide of blame: physicians, nurses, hospital system and hospital culture, and do 
not include individual versus non-individuals. The sum of the four values totals to 
100% at the level of the individual respondent, although this consistency breaks down 
once we start taking means. 
Our graphical representations of these vectors will show that—as we would expect from 
the structure of our analysis—the net vectors for physician versus nurse point in the exact 
same direction as the raw physician versus nurse vectors above: they are just shorter, 
because they are multiplied by the person’s overall allocation to individuals. (Readers are 
encouraged to compare these vectors with the original vectors on the preceding pages to 
verify this for themselves—just remember that the physician-versus-nurse vectors earlier 
on were on the right-hand side of the page.) We will also now include the hospital 
system versus hospital culture projections of these vectors, as these become somewhat 
statistically significant at this level of the analysis. 
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